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Une Théorie pour Deux Primes de Risques 
 
Résumé 
Dans la présentation traditionnelle du modèle de l’espérance d’utilité, la prime de risque 
représente ce qu’un individu, averse au risque, est prêt à payer pour être débarrassé d’un 
risque.  Dans cet article, nous introduisons une prime de risque différente qui répond à la 
question suivante : quelle espérance de gain un risque (qui peut être la rentabilité d’un actif 
financier) doit-il offrir pour être accepté par un agent averse au risque ? Bien que cette prime 
de risque découle du « bid price » défini par Pratt (1964), elle ne doit pas être confondu avec 
lui ; le « bid price » représentant la compensation monétaire du risque. La prime de risque 
traditionnelle fait référence à un comportement d’évitement du risque alors que notre prime 
de risque fait référence à un comportement de prise de risque.  Nous revisitons les principaux 
résultats concernant l’aversion au risque dans le modèle de l’espérance d’utilité avec cette 
prime de risque et nous en déduisons ses principales propriétés. 
Mots-clés : Choix en incertain, espérance d’utilité, aversion au risque, prime de risque. 
 
One Theory For Two Risk Premia 
Abstract 
Generally,  in  the  standard  presentation  of  the  expected  utility  model,  the  risk  premium 
represents how much a risk-averse decision maker is ready to pay to have a risk eliminated.  
Here, however, we introduce a different risk premium: how much should a risk (which could 
be the return on a financial asset) yield to be acceptable to a risk-averse decision maker.  
Although our risk premium is derived from the Pratt bid price, it should not be confused with 
it: the Pratt bid price represents the monetary compensation of a risk. The standard risk 
premium refers to risk-avoidance; our risk premium, however, refers to risk-taking.  We then 
reanalyse the main results concerning risk aversion under expected utility using this risk 
premium tool and deduce its main properties. 
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Generally, in the standard presentation of the expected utility model,
the risk premium represents how much a risk-averse decision maker is
ready to pay to have a risk eliminated. Here, however, we introduce
a diﬀerent risk premium: how much should a risk (which could be the
return on a ﬁnancial asset) yield to be acceptable to a risk-averse decision
maker. Although our risk premium is derived from the Pratt bid price,
it should not be confused with it: the Pratt bid price represents the
monetary compensation of a risk. The standard risk premium refers to
risk-avoidance; our risk premium, however, refers to risk-taking. We then
reanalyse the main results concerning risk aversion under expected utility
using this risk premium tool and deduce its main properties.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81.
Keywords: choices under uncertainty, expected utility, risk aversion,
risk premium.
1 Introduction
The risk premium, originally introduced by Friedman and Savage (1948) and
Pratt (1964) in the expected utility framework, is a characteristic of preferences,
representing the monetary cost equivalent to the desutility of risk. This risk
premium, which can be understood as the maximal amount of money that the
decision maker (DM) is ready to pay to have a risk eliminated, constitutes a
central concept in the theory of choice under uncertainty.
Here, we focus on another risk premium which represents how much a risk
(which could be the return on a ﬁnancial asset) should yield to be undertaken
by a risk-averse decision maker. Even though our risk premium is derived from
the Pratt (1964) bid price for the risk, it should not be confused with it: the
Pratt bid price represents the monetary compensation of a risk. Whereas the
Friedman-Savage-Pratt risk premium focusses on risk-avoidance, making it an
appropriate tool for analyzing insurance problems, the risk premium we intro-
duce here considers risk-taking, making it more appropriate for ﬁnancial models.
∗GREThA, Universit´ e Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, avenue L´ eon Duguit, 33608 Pessac cedex,
France. e-mail: emmanuelle.gabillon@u-bordeaux4.fr. TEL. : 33 (0)5 56 84 29 97 / FAX : 33
(0)5 56 84 86 47.
1We therefore use this concept to reanalyze the Arrow (1971) portfolio prob-
lem, explaining why a risk-averse investor invests in a risky asset as soon as its
expected rate of return is higher than the risk-free rate.
We also establish the relationships between the two risk premia: in general,
these premia are not equal. We also show that the Friedman-Savage-Pratt risk
premium shares many properties with our risk premium. Whenever this occurs,
we indicate the similarities between our results and those of La Vall´ ee (1968) in
his comparison of the Pratt bid and ask prices.
In Section 1, after a brief presentation of the Pratt bid and ask prices,
we deﬁne our risk-taking premium and use it to explain the results obtained
by Arrow (1971) in his portfolio choice model. In Section 2, we focus on the
properties of the risk-taking premium and on its links with the Friedman-Savage-
Pratt risk premium.
2 The risk premia
First, we recall brieﬂy the deﬁnition of the bid and ask prices introduced by
Pratt (1964). We then introduce the risk-taking premium. In order to do so,
we consider a risk-averse decision maker whose preferences are represented by a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(.). The function u(.) is assumed
to be increasing and concave.
2.1 The Pratt bid-ask prices and the risk-avoiding pre-
mium
Pratt (1964) deﬁned an asking price Pa and a bid price Pb for a risk   y that
aﬀects, in an additive way, the DM’s wealth W. Pratt deﬁned the asking price
as ‘the smallest amount for which the DM would willingly sell   y if he had it’:
u(W + Pa) = E [u(W +   y)] (1)
where E is the expectation operator.
The bid price Pb is deﬁned as ‘the largest amount the DM would willingly
pay to obtain   y’ which is given by
u(W) = E [u(W +   y − Pb)] (2)
In his paper, Pratt concentrated on the risk premium associated with the
asking price. Let πu
ay denote this risk premium, which satisﬁes
u
 
W + E (  y) − πu
ay
 
= E [u(W +   y)] (3)
This risk premium had previously been brought to light by Friedman and
Savage (1948). The comparison of equation (1) and equation (3) gives
2πu
ay = E (  y) − Pa (4)
The premium πu
ay represents the maximal amount that the DM is willing
to pay to obtain E (  y) instead of   y. This risk premium is to be found in any
standard manual treating of economics under uncertainty. Since πu
ay represents
the DM’s personal monetary appreciation of having the risk eliminated, we will
refer to it here as the risk-avoiding premium (RAP).
2.2 The risk-taking premium
Let us decompose a risk   y as follows:
  y = E (  y) +   εy with E (  εy) = 0 (5)
The risk   εy is the zero-mean risk included in lottery   y or, stated in another
way,   εy is the pure risk which characterizes lottery   y.
We can now introduce the deﬁnition of our risk-taking premium (RTP):
Deﬁnition 1
The risk-taking premium πu
by represents the minimal expected payoﬀ that risk






by +   εy
  
= u(W)
The RTP is the minimal expected payoﬀ that risk   y should yield to have
pure risk   εy accepted by the DM, while the RAP is the maximal amount that
the DM is ready to pay to have pure risk   εy eliminated.
From Equations (2) and (5) and Deﬁnition 1, we obtain the relation between
the RTP and the bid price
πu
by = E (  y) − Pb (6)
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1
If E (  y) > πu
by then the DM prefers to take risk   y.
If E (  y) = πu
by then the DM is indiﬀerent as to taking or not taking risk   y.
If E (  y) < πu
by then the DM prefers not to take risk   y.





by +   εy
  
⋚
E [u(W + E (  y) +   εy)] if πu
by ⋚ E (  y).
3Proposition 1 states that the DM will take a risk if the expected payoﬀ is
large enough. Although the general idea is not new, we still need to know what
‘large enough’ means: the precise deﬁnition of this is given here by πu
by.
This RTP πu
by can then easily be used to analyse the portfolio decision prob-
lem presented by Arrow (1971). The DM can choose to invest in a risky asset
and in a riskless one. By normalizing the risk-free rate to zero and noting m
the amount invested in the risky asset, the DM’s programme can be written
Max
m E [u(W + m  y)] (7)
where   y represents the risky asset rate of return.
If m∗ denotes the optimal investment in the risky asset, Arrow showed that
m∗ > 0 as soon as E (  y) > 0. This result, which might appear surprising
at ﬁrst sight, is not in contradiction with Proposition 1 which states that the
DM accepts to take a risk only if its expected payoﬀ is large enough. On the
contrary, risk premium πu








bmy + m  εy
  
= u(W) (8)
where m  εy represents the level of investor risk exposure.
This gives the following proposition:
Proposition 2
∀E (  y) > 0 (even if very small), there exists   m > 0 (which may be very small)
such that ∀m ≤   m, πu
bmy < mE (  y).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, even if E (  y) is very small, as soon as it is strictly positive, the optimal
investment in risky asset m∗ is strictly positive. This is because when m is small
enough, the minimal expected rate of return πu
bmy that the risky asset should
yield to be desirable is lower than its real yield mE (  y). As Arrow indicated:
‘for small amounts at risk, the utility function is approximately linear, and
risk aversion disappears’. In the present paper, we develop the mechanism
underlying Arrow’s assertion by showing that πu
bmy tends towards zero more
rapidly than mE (  y).
Arrow also showed that m∗ is increasing in wealth when the coeﬃcient of




′(W) is decreasing. We shed further light
on this result in the next section.
43 The risk-taking premium properties
In what follows, as it is more appropriate to present πu
by as a function of W, we
have adopted the notation πu
by (W).
We establish the links between the RAP and the RTP:
Proposition 3
For any risk   y, ∀W, πu












ay (W) + E (  y)
 
Proof. See Appendix B.
The ﬁrst relation deﬁnes πu
ay (W) starting from πu
by (W), and the second
relation deﬁnes πu
by (W) starting from πu
ay (W). Since Equation (4) establishes
a relation between the RAP and the ask price and Equation (6) establishes a
relation between the RTP and the bid price, Proposition 3 can be rewritten
using both the ask and bid prices. This allows us to obtain the results of La
Vall´ ee (1968), although those came from a diﬀerent framework. La Vall´ ee (1968)
studied the ask price required by a DM for taking a decision under uncertainty
on the basis of certain information. He also studied the price oﬀered by the DM
in exchange for selling this possibility.
Proposition 3, which gives the relation between the two risk premia, gener-
ates three corollaries.
In the ﬁrst two of these, we highlight the symmetry between the two risk
premia. Pratt (1964) had previously demonstrated that πu
ay (W) is decreasing
when Au (W) is decreasing in wealth, which is the most reasonable assumption
about risk aversion. We demonstrate a similar property using the RTP.
Corollary 1
If, for any   y, πu
ay (W) is decreasing in wealth then, for any risk   y, πu
by (W) is
decreasing in wealth.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Given Corollary 1, if Au (W) is decreasing in wealth, then πu
by (W) is also de-
creasing in wealth. This property also applies to risk premium πu
bmy (W) which
characterizes the Arrow portfolio problem (see Equation 8). This result allows
us to understand why m∗ is an increasing function of wealth: the diﬀerence
mE (  y) − πu
bmy (W), which justiﬁes an investment in the risky asset, increases
with wealth.
Pratt (1964) demonstrated that agent v is more risk averse than agent u if
and only if ∀  y,∀W, πv
ay (W) ≥ πu
ay (W). We demonstrate that this property can
also be written using the RTP.
5Corollary 2
The two statements are equivalent:
For any risk   y, ∀W, πv
ay (W) ≥ πu
ay (W).
For any risk   y, ∀W, πv
by (W) ≥ πu
by (W).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Whereas the two above-mentioned corollaries stress the symmetry between
the two risk premia, the third corollary which follows allows us to compare and
contrast the two premia.
Corollary 3
For any   y, if πu
ay (W) is decreasing in wealth,
πu
by (W) < πu
ay (W) when the risk is not desirable (πu
by (W) > E (  y)).
πu
by (W) ≥ πu
ay (W) when the risk is desirable (πu
by (W) ≤ E (  y)).
Proof. See Appendix E.
According to Corollaries 1 and 3, under decreasing absolute risk aversion,
the risk premia behave as follows:
Figure 1: The two risk premia as functions of wealth under decreasing absolute
risk aversion
When the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is not constant, there is asym-
metry between the two risk premia which do not coincide1. La Vall´ ee (1968)
obtained similar results with the bid and ask prices. Under decreasing absolute
risk aversion, he showed that the ask price is lower than the bid price when both
1Under constant absolute risk aversion, the RAP is constant and it is easy to see from
Proposition 3 that the RTP is equal to the RAP.
6prices are negative (the risk is not desirable) and higher when this is not the
case (the risk is desirable).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we envisage the risk premium in terms of risk-taking, unlike the
standard approach which focusses on risk-avoidance. The equity premium ob-
served on the ﬁnancial market, which reﬂects the average investors’ risk aversion,
corresponds to the risk-taking premium deﬁnition developed in this paper.
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Appendix A
We deduce from Equation (8) that πu
bmy = 0 when m = 0.
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(A.2)
where cov is the covariance operator.







bmy is increasing in m.




(m = 0) = −
u
′




The derivative of πu
bmy is equal to zero when m = 0.



























∂m2 ≥ 0 (A.6)
The premium πu
bmy is convex with respect to m.
Equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.6) give the following ﬁgure:
Figure 2: πu
bmy decreases towards zero more rapidly than mE (  y)
We can conclude that, ∀E (  y) > 0 (even if very small), there exists   m > 0
(which may be very small) such that ∀m <   m, πu
bmy < mE (  y).
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by (W) +   εy
  
= u(W) = u
 
W + πu
by (W) − E (  y) +
 

















by (W) − E (  y) + E (  y) +   εy
  
(B.2)



















y (W + πu
bε (W) − E (  y)) represents the certainty equivalent of   y
when the DM’s wealth is W + πu
bε (W) − E (  y).
Thus, from Equations (B.1) and (B.3), we obtain
E (  y) − πu











by (W) − E (  y)
 








































+   εy
  
(B.7)
The above two equations imply that
E (  y) = ECu

















Deriving Equation (B.9) with respect to W gives
∀W, πu′











ay (W) ≤ 0 ⇒ ∀W, πu′
by (W) ≤ 0.
Appendix D
∀W, we have πv
ay (W) ≥ πu
ay (W) if and only if any risk that is undesirable for
agent u is also undesirable for agent v. This condition can be written as follows:
E [u(W +   y)] ≤ u(W) ⇒ E [v (W +   y)] ≤ v (W) (D.1)
Using Equation (5) and Deﬁnition 1, the above condition becomes
E [u(W + E (  y) +   εy)] ≤ u
 
W + πu
by (W) +   εy
 
⇒ E [v (W + E (  y) +   εy)] ≤ v
 
W + πv
by (W) +   εy
 
(D.2)
which is equivalent to
E (  y) ≤ πu




by (W) ≥ πu
by (W) (D.4)
Appendix E
Using Equation (B.5) we have
If πu
ay (W) is decreasing and the risk is not desirable to the DM, then
∀W, πu





by (W) − E (  y)







ay (W) is decreasing and the risk is desirable to the DM, then
∀W, πu





by (W) − E (  y)
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